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“The Path to Freedom”? Transocean and German Wireless 
Telegraphy, 1914-1922 
Heidi J. S. Evans
 ∗ 
Abstract: »„Der Weg ins Freie”? Transocean und die deutsche drahtlose Te-
legraphie, 1914-1922«. This article examines the early years of Transocean, a 
news agency owned and run by the German government, and its use of wire-
less telegraphy from 1914 to 1922. This investigation of the infancy of wireless 
technology demonstrates that technology plays a constitutive role in defining 
news. The German government used the new possibilities innate in the medium 
of wireless to carve out their own sphere of operation in the seas and on conti-
nents where German telegraph news had never played a major role, in particu-
lar East Asia. Wireless telegraphy enabled the German government to circum-
vent the British communications blockade in World War I. Afterwards, 
Transocean’s wireless transmissions to East Asia and ships en route caused an 
uproar in Britain disproportionate to its circulation. It was the Germans’ inno-
vative use of wireless telegraphy that other nations, particularly the British, 
found most disturbing, rather than the content of the reports themselves. 
Keywords: wireless telegraphy, radio, news agency, Northcliffe, Schwedler, 
Transocean, maritime history, ocean history, World War I. 
 
“The path to freedom” was how Wilhelm Schwedler assessed wireless technol-
ogy’s potential in 1922.
1 He believed that wireless was causing a revolution in 
global communications, which would slowly allow Germany to regain a more 
powerful position in global media and, by extension, global politics.
2 For him, 
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1   Wilhelm Schwedler, Die Nachricht im Weltverkehr (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft 
für Politik und Geschichte, 1922), 128. The term “wireless telegraphy” refers to the early 
years of radio communication. Unlike radio, wireless telegraphy does not emit or transmit 
speech. It used Morse code to transmit messages through electromagnetic waves. The cor-
responding German term is drahtloser Funkspruch, with Funkspruch referring to the sparks 
(Funke) required for early wireless technology. We use the word wireless today in WLAN 
(Wireless Local Area Network), while in German, Rundfunk is still used to designate radio 
and often television as well. Thus presently, “wireless” tends to refer to methods of radio 
communication, while “radio” means the actual devices used to send and receive. In the 
early 1920s, the head of the German Post Office, Hans Bredow, wanted to fight against the 
infiltration of foreign words into German, such as “radio” and “broadcasting”, though he 
was ultimately unsuccessful. Reich Radio Commission Meeting, January 23, 1924, BArch 
R3301/2098, 125. 
2   Schwedler, Die Nachricht im Weltverkehr, x.   210
wireless was a means to revive news as an object of trade capable of generating 
profits. Schwedler was chief editor of the German government-owned news 
agency, Transocean, from 1918 to his death in May 1936. Transocean had 
developed from a news agency founded in 1913 with the explicit purpose of 
spreading German news overseas. This became especially urgent after World 
War I, when the news agency cartel contract between Reuters, Agence Havas, 
Associated Press and the German Wolffs Telegraphisches Bureau (WTB) was 
renegotiated such that the WTB was only responsible for news within Ger-
many’s borders. After World War I, Schwedler was a key figure in government 
attempts to undermine this regulatory system of news control that had boxed 
Germany into its newly reduced boundaries.  
Yet wireless telegraphy both did and didn’t reflect Schwedler’s ideas of 
news as an object of trade and powerful political tool. Rather than drawing its 
power from its profitability, for German wireless, at least, its greatest impact 
lay where it was free. It did not reinvigorate German news in areas where news 
via telegraph dominated. Wireless could broadcast to a number of receivers 
within a certain range, rather than point-to-point like the telegraph. This greatly 
influenced wireless’ customer base and geographical impact. Wireless compa-
nies used the possibilities innate in the medium of radio to carve out their own 
sphere of operation in the seas and on continents where German telegraph news 
had never played a major role, in particular in South America and East Asia. In 
Asia, they especially resented the British for dominating the news market and 
believed that this situation had negative economic and political repercussions 
for Germany. During and after World War I, successive German governments 
attempted to redress what they saw as an unfair distribution of the global dis-
semination and collection of news. The main means they chose was wireless 
telegraphy with a news agency, Transocean, founded specifically for this pur-
pose. As reactions to these developments will show, it was the Germans’ inno-
vative use of the technology of wireless telegraphy, which other nations, par-
ticularly the British, found most disturbing, rather than the content of the 
reports themselves.  
Histories of news agencies have, quite correctly, emphasized the fundamen-
tal link between the spread of the telegraph and the foundation of news agen-
cies in the mid-nineteenth century. The “Big Three” news agencies were all 
founded in this period: Agence Havas in 1835, the WTB in 1849, and Reuters 
in 1851.
3 Technology created markets, as telegraph routes influenced journal-
ists’ bases and geographical foci; the astounding expansion of the telegraph in 
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Agenturpublizistik zwischen Politik und Wirtschaft (München and New York: K.G. Saur, 
1991); Donald Read, The Power of News: The History of Reuters. 2nd ed. (Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Antoine Lefebure, Havas: Les arcanes du pouvoir 
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the mid-nineteenth century was essential for the global operations of the Big 
Three. Yet the importance of new technology for news agencies did not end 
with the telegraph. Wireless telegraphy and telephony also had a remarkable 
impact. As an investigation of the infancy of wireless demonstrates, technology 
plays a constitutive role in defining what news is and means. Conceptions of 
news are of course not static: they change depending upon the criteria for 
newsworthy items. These criteria in turn are largely determined by the political, 
economic and technological networks behind the transmission of reports. Par-
ticularly for Germany, wireless telegraphy provided a means to communicate 
with the wider world in World War I and thereafter, vastly changing how these 
messages were transmitted and thereby what they meant.  
Even before the German government officially began to regulate the wire-
less industry in 1923, its civilian and military needs dictated much of wireless’ 
development. Wireless formed an integral part of the German government’s 
information warfare during World War I and the immediate postwar years. As 
Jonathan Reed Winkler points out, information warfare during World War I 
remains understudied, yet was an essential component of both Britain’s and 
Germany’s war strategies.
4 Studies of German propaganda during World War I 
have mainly dealt with propaganda within Germany or regulation of the written 
press by the German government;
5 historians of Weimar and Nazi Germany 
have focused on the use of radio as a mass medium mainly in connection with 
propaganda, artistic endeavours, domestic listening and political struggles over 
regulatory control.
6 Meanwhile, historians of technology have concentrated on 
the history of the invention of radio in the 1890s and early 1900s.
7 The link 
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Pinkerton and Klaus Dodds, “Radio Geopolitics: Broadcasting, Listening and the Need for 
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between early invention and spoken medium is wireless’ early method of 
transmission in Morse code to a limited audience; these early years of wireless 
before 1923 are relatively understudied.
8 Use and invention are thus mostly 
examined in separate studies. 
Yet, as David Edgerton has shown, use and innovation of technology are in-
tricately linked, despite differences in geography, chronology and sociology. 
He postulates that, “invention and innovation rarely lead to use, but use often 
leads to invention and innovation.”
9 This is clearly the case with wireless tech-
nology and its use on the ocean. After its initial development by Guglielmo 
Marconi (1874-1937) and Ferdinand Braun (1850-1918) in the late 1890s, 
many felt that the dense continental telegraph system negated the need for 
wireless as another means of communication on land.
10 In Germany, the mili-
tary was the first to see potential in wireless. The German Navy believed that 
wireless was far better suited to ships than land: it allowed them to coordinate 
manoeuvres and all 90 German warships were equipped with radios in 1909. 
To develop the technology further, the Navy used the privately-owned wireless 
company, Telefunken, which had been founded in 1903.
11 Telefunken devel-
oped wireless to become effective military technology from 1905 to 1908, and 
the quenched spark system emerged from these needs.
12 This system was Tele-
funken’s great step forward: its implementation in 1909 increased the number 
of stations accessible at sea and thereby Telefunken’s commercial success.
13 
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munikationssystems 1905-1914 (Berlin: Diepholz, 1999), 13. 
13  Max Wien developed the quenched spark system (or spark gap transmission) in 1906; it is 
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interference. See Michael Friedewald, “The Beginnings of Radio Communication in Ger-
many, 1897-1918,” Journal of Radio Studies 7:2 (2000): 448 ff. This system prevailed until 
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Transocean generally broadcast using Morse code and the quenched spark system. It laid 
the groundwork for later systems, though in terms of technological development, Friede-
wald calls it a “cul-de-sac”. Die “Tönenden Funken”, 157.   213
Passenger ships became a key source of income, both for passenger messages 
and safety reasons. After the “Titanic conference” in London in November 
1913, all ships with over 50 passengers had to install radio. The imperative of 
safety enabled Telefunken to break Marconi’s monopoly: all ships were now 
legally obliged to be able to communicate with each other. Marconi’s initial 
monopoly had been based on its stipulation that Marconi radios could only 
communicate with each other. By 1914, the monopoly of Marconi had devel-
oped into a market on the sea controlled by Telefunken and Marconi.
14 Marconi 
and Telefunken also cooperated, founding a joint operating company, Deutsche 
Betriebsgesellschaft für drahtlose Telegraphie (DEBEG) in 1911.
15 The sea 
had thus presented Telefunken with its chance both to change existing tele-
communications relations between Britain and Germany and to stamp its mark 
on the future development of radio. This pre-war competition between Tele-
funken and Marconi illustrated the importance of the sea in setting a precedent 
for wireless regulation and control of markets. 
In fact, Telefunken was “the main driving force in the development of wire-
less technology in Germany” until 1918.
16 Its close relationship to various 
government figures ensured that the German government considered it a reli-
able partner in using technology to achieve political aims. Aside from naval 
purposes, the German government initially saw wireless technology as a means 
to reach its colonies in East and South-West Africa without using Great Brit-
ain’s “All Red Line” of telegraph connections around the world.
17 Given their 
imperial rivalries, Germany increasingly wished to circumvent British routes 
by laying their own cables and by promoting wireless technology.
18 Wireless 
also provided a means to subvert the existing cartel of news agencies, both 
during and after World War I.
19 Under the cartel prior to World War I, the 
                                                             
14  See W. J. Baker, “The Commercial War with Germany,” in History of the Marconi Com-
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Hansard, October 11, 1912, col. 680. 
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WTB was responsible for Germany, its colonies, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 
Scandinavia and Russia.
20 After World War I, however, a new contract was 
renegotiated whereby the WTB only supplied Germany; this provided added 
incentive for Weimar governments to use wireless to circumvent these restric-
tions. 
Even prior to World War I, many Germans thought that the cartel arrange-
ment was detrimental to Germany’s image abroad. In 1913, the Bund der In-
dustriellen (Association of Industrialists) complained about the “one-sided 
influencing of foreign press by certain French and English news agencies.”
21 
Conversely, the Verein Deutscher Zeitungsverleger (Organization of German 
Newspaper Publishers) declared in 1912 that the cartel arrangement forced the 
WTB to deliver anti-German material to German newspapers.
22 Otto Ham-
mann, the head of the German press department since 1894, had long shared 
these sentiments. In 1908, Hammann had headed the Transatlantisches Büro 
(Transatlantic Bureau), newly founded by the German Foreign Ministry to 
subvert the influence of the cartel abroad. The Bureau mainly operated in South 
America and Australia and formed the basis of the Syndikat Deutscher Über-
seedienst (German Overseas Service Syndicate) in 1913.
23 The syndicate pro-
fessed to have three aims: to subvert the cartel, promote trade and influence 
neutral countries.
24 Hammann chose to exclude the press and included around 
300 industrialists in the syndicate, whom he considered indispensable for two 
reasons.
25 Firstly, they had money. Secondly, this close connection with indus-
try would increase the syndicate’s trustworthiness and thus efficacy abroad by 
erasing the trace of officialdom.
26  
                                                                                                                                
when the AP forced Reuters to abandon these arrangements and the Nazis merged the WTB 
and Alfred Hugenberg’s Telegraphen Union to create the Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro. 
20  Within its sphere, the WTB negotiated contracts of news exchange with particular national 
and imperial news agencies. Its cooperation with these agencies stifled competition within 
those countries, as other news agencies had far less access to foreign news. Terhi Rantanen 
calls this the “bi-directional dependency” of global agencies, which were always dependent 
on news supply from smaller agencies within their spheres. Terhi Rantanen, “The Struggle 
for Control of Domestic News Markets,” in The Globalization of News, eds. Oliver Boyd-
Barrett and Terhi Rantanen (London: Sage Publications, 1998), 35-48. 
21  Quoted in Rudolf Rotheit, Die Friedensbedingungen der deutschen Presse. Los von Reuter 
und Havas! (Berlin: Puttkammer & Mühlbrecht, 1915), 13. 
22  Ibid., 14. 
23  Messages sent by the syndicate were labeled “Transocean”, hence the later name for the 
government agency, the registered company and its publications. 
24  Syndikat Deutscher Überseedienst, Grundlagen und Ziele des Deutschen Überseedienstes 
(Berlin: Transocean GmbH, 1915), 5. 
25   These men came from four major economic sectors: banking, shipping, trade and heavy 
industry. 
26  Cornelius Klee, “Die Transocean GmbH,” in Telegraphenbüros und Nachrichtenagenturen 
in Deutschland: Untersuchungen zu ihrer Geschichte bis 1949, ed. Jürgen Wilke (München 
and New York: K. G. Saur, 1991), 138-9.   215
The syndicate’s aims and responsibility changed radically with the outbreak 
of World War I. The German government relied on wireless and the Nauen, 
Eilvese and Königswusterhausen transmitter stations after British cable steam-
ers cut five of Germany’s transatlantic and undersea cables to Spain, America 
and the German colonies at the start of World War I and forced the Portuguese 
to forbid Germany from using its only remaining cable to America via the 
Azores in December 1914.
27 The registration of a limited company followed in 
September 1915, while the syndicate continued to operate to attract new mem-
bers. The syndicate’s working party met regularly in Berlin’s prestigious Hotel 
Adlon and included such well-known figures as the industrialist and future 
media magnate, Alfred Hugenberg (1865-1951), the future chancellor and 
foreign minister, Gustav Stresemann (1878-1929), the future president of the 
Reichsbank and Nazi economic minister from 1934-1937, Hjalmar Schacht 
(1877-1970), and the industrialist and politician Hugo Stinnes (1870-1924).
28  
Yet the government and the industrialists were unable to cooperate for long 
and by mid-1916 the syndicate had split.
29 The two groups could not reconcile 
their differences on war aims nor agree upon how to handle incoming news. 
While the government had wished to make the news available to all interested 
parties as a general newspaper service, the industrialists had hoped to gain a 
market advantage through receiving exclusive information. Two companies 
emerged:  Deutscher Überseedienst and Transocean. While the members of 
both companies remained the same, industrialists generally paid little attention 
to Transocean thereafter.
30 The industrialists maintained Deutscher Überseedi-
enst GmbH (German Overseas Service) as a service for exclusive subscribers; 
it principally reported on foreign economic news. Meanwhile, the government 
ran and subsidized Transocean GmbH to deliver news overseas and support 
German foreign policy. The German Chancellor was to appoint the head of its 
advisory committee.
31 Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg (1856-1921), Chan-
cellor in 1916, chose Otto Hammann, who resigned from his post as head of the 
press department to concentrate on Transocean full time. Transocean attempted 
                                                             
27  Nauen’s trial service began in 1906 and its operator, Transradio AG, handed it over to the 
German army and navy for use throughout the war, along with the transmitter stations 
Eilvese and Königswusterhausen. Nauen was extended a few times between 1908 and 1916 
and finally “represented the prototype of a long-wave station with quenched spark transmit-
ter and high frequency alternators with a power of 100 kW or 250 kW respectively.” Mi-
chael Friedewald, “The Beginnings of Radio Communication in Germany, 1897-1918”, 
457. 
28   For more information on the history of Transocean, see Klee, “Die Transocean GmbH”, 
135-211. 
29  Alfred Hugenberg had advocated for separating the costs for economic and political news 
since at least May 1915. BArch R901/57866, 76. 
30  Klee, “Die Transocean GmbH,” 152. 
31  Five representatives from each of the four major economic sectors and five from the major 
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throughout the war to integrate with the cartel member, the WTB, but only 
reached a cooperative agreement in April 1918. This allowed Transocean to 
disseminate WTB materials overseas for an annual fee of 10,000 Marks. 
Transocean agreed to leave commercial services to the WTB, meaning that 
Transocean would remain government-subsidized and controlled after World 
War I.
32 
Even during World War I, Transocean had become “de facto a branch of the 
foreign ministry,” with its editors working in the foreign ministry building in 
Berlin.
33 Transocean’s working committee was guided by the belief that no 
news agency could exist without the foreign ministry if it wanted to dissemi-
nate its news abroad.
34 The foreign ministry’s diplomatic network was essential 
for collection and distribution of news to South America and East Asia. Trans-
ocean relied upon consular officials and engineers, along with volunteers (of 
which there were 14 by May 1915), paid employees such as journalists and 
occasional reporters such as travellers.
35 Transocean also received news and 
pictures from various government departments engaged in propaganda activi-
ties, such as the Zentralstelle für Auslandsdienst (Central Department for For-
eign Service), the war press department and government press conferences.
36 
For instance, Transocean cooperated with the Zentralstelle für Auslandsdienst 
for its photo books, The Great War in Pictures. The structure of the German 
government’s press departments was initially somewhat chaotic; the creation of 
a war press department in October 1915 under Major Erhard Deutelmoser only 
partially regulated these difficulties. These overlapping competencies made 
implementation of coordinated news and propaganda efforts and coherent 
reporting rather difficult.
37  
Transocean news was disseminated in European countries allied with Ger-
many but it mainly focused on the Americas and East Asia.
38 In 1914, Nauen 
                                                             
32  Klee, “Die Transocean GmbH,” 158. 
33  Ibid., 155. 
34  Working Committee Meeting, May 28, 1915, BArch R901/57866, 75. 
35  Ibid., 98-9. 
36    The ZfA dealt mainly with periodicals, pictures, films, pamphlets and other means of 
disseminating propaganda such as talks, concerts. For more detail, see Wilke, “Deutsche 
Auslandspropaganda im Ersten Weltkrieg: Die Zentralstelle für Auslandsdienst,” 79-124; 
Wilke, Presseanweisungen im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert. Erster Weltkrieg– Drittes Reich– 
DDR; and Welch, Germany, Propaganda and Total War 1914-1918: the Sins of Omission. 
Transocean was however the only agency sending out news via wireless overseas. 
37  See Martin Creuz, Die Pressepolitik der kaiserlichen Regierung während des Ersten Welt-
kriegs: Die Exekutive, die Journalisten und der Teufelskreis der Berichterstattung (Frank-
furt am Main and New York: P. Lang, 1996) and Kurt Koszyk, Deutsche Pressepolitik im 
Ersten Weltkrieg (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1968). 
38  The WTB ran a wireless service to its part of the globe under the cartel contract, supplying 
Europe, Baghdad, German East Africa, the Azores and Tenerife with a service from Nauen 
at 1 a.m. The WTB also sent out a joint service with the German Navy of 200 words twice a 
day, at 11 p.m. and 7 a.m., from a station in Norddeich, Schleswig-Holstein. The service 
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was the only European station capable of transmitting waves to North America, 
specifically to stations in Sayville, New York and Tuckerton, New Jersey.
39 As 
Tuckerton was more suited to sending messages, the Germans generally used 
Sayville as the receiving station for messages in Europe.
40 Nauen transmitted 
news to Sayville at least twice a day.
41 Under the supervision of the American 
Navy, who had placed men in each station in August 1914 to ensure neutrality 
and enforce the law forbidding the Germans to communicate with ships, the 
clerks at Sayville disseminated the news via telegraph to the three main Ameri-
can news agencies: Associated Press, United Press and International News 
Service. The news agencies paid for these telegrams; in October 1916, Trans-
ocean’s news reached approximately 2000 American newspapers.
42 Transocean 
news was spread to South America from the US via a complicated network of 
cables in neutral countries in Central America such as Guatemala. By October 
1914, the British had destroyed German wireless stations on the strategically 
important island of Yap and in Africa, leaving the Germans with wireless 
routes within Europe and to the United States.
43 The news was thus cabled to 
Asia via San Francisco and Guam to Manila and Shanghai. By May 1915, 
Transocean cabled 25,000 words monthly, approximately as much as Reuters.
44 
From August 1915, a new wireless connection between Funabashi near Yoko-
hama and the Hawaiian islands enabled wireless transmission of Transocean 
news between Japan and the United States.
45 Telegrams were then cabled to 
Siam from the Swatow station in South China.
46 Once the US officially de-
                                                                                                                                
was limited, as Norddeich was close to the Navy’s ships, meaning ships could not radio 
while the waves were being used for news. The Navy didn’t rate this service as influential 
on the press in neutral Europe, especially as wireless was not quicker within Europe. Hol-
land and Scandinavia, for example, received news more swiftly by telegraph than wireless. 
Letter from Reichsmarineamt to the state secretary of the foreign ministry, October 13, 
1915, BArch R901/57866, 300. Thus in terms of wireless news, Transocean’s overseas ser-
vice was more important. 
39  The German radio company, Telefunken, had bought the two sites to construct radio towers 
in 1912. There was a direct connection between Sayville and Nauen from 1914 onwards 
when transmission power was increased to 100 kW. Tuckerton was open for two-way 
transmission in May 1914 and by May 1916 its signals could be picked up 9000 miles away 
in Sydney, the world record for that time. 
40    See Roy M. Nunn, “The Goldschmidt Wireless of Tuckerton, New Jersey” (bachelor’s 
thesis, Albright College, 1967). Tuckerton generally communicated with the radio station in 
Eilvese, near Hanover once this was possible. 
41  In November 1915, it cost 2 marks 10 pfennigs per word from Nauen to the United States. 
BArch R901/57866, 427. 
42  BArch R901/57869, 60. 
43  Winkler, “Information Warfare in World War I,” 849ff. 
44  August 3, 1915, Mitteilungen der Transocean, Nr. 2, 1. 
45  August 26, 1915, Mitteilungen der Transocean, Nr. 3, 2. There had been a wireless connec-
tion between California and Hawaii since September 1914. 
46  Schwedler later saw this as proof of great interest in Asia in German news. Schwedler, Die 
Nachricht im Weltverkehr, 82.   218
clared war on Germany on April 6, 1917, the first hostile act between the two 
countries was the US Marines’ seizure of the Sayville receiving station. By this 
time, however, Nauen’s range of over 11,000 km meant that Sayville was no 
longer necessary to transmit radio signals to Asia.
47 
Transocean’s service became highly regarded in the Far East because of its 
integration of cable and wireless, according to Wilhelm Schwedler.
48 In its own 
news reports in August 1915, Transocean’s success in East Asia was attributed 
to two reasons. Firstly, it had gained a foothold in the region before the out-
break of war with two German-language newspapers: Ostasiatischer Lloyd, 
founded 1900, and the Deutsche Japan-Post. Secondly, Carl Fink, the chief 
editor of Ostasiatischer Lloyd, and Wilhelm Schwedler had developed an or-
ganization that circumvented the British communications blockade through the 
combination of wireless and cable described above.
49 Transocean’s dissemina-
tion of photo books, called Der Große Krieg in Bildern (The Great War in 
Pictures) further raised the profile of German news. Carl Fink of Ostasiatischer 
Lloyd wrote of the first Great War in Pictures that he found this type of propa-
ganda “extraordinarily fortunate” and that he had in fact translated the accom-
panying text into Chinese at his own cost.
50  
Correspondence about the success of wireless transmission by Transocean 
happened at the highest levels of government. From January 1916, the German 
ambassador in Washington from 1908 to 1917, Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff 
(1862-1939), sent fortnightly reports to Bethmann-Hollweg, detailing which 
radiograms were being received.
51 From mid-1916, the German embassy in 
Washington DC served as an intermediary between Sayville and the American 
news agencies, as Bernstorff believed that the addition of American news 
would increase the effectiveness of the service.
52 Messages sent from Sayville 
and Tuckerton to the German embassy were treated as prepaid messages, and 
thus not given the press rate. This greatly increased the cost of the service in 
America.
53 
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In America itself, Transocean’s name was rarely mentioned. Many Ameri-
can papers published Transocean news, while labelling it as the “Overseas 
News Agency” or “Berlin (date) by wireless to Sayville” instead.
54 These 
newspapers included the New York Times,  Chicago Herald,  Chicago Daily 
Tribune and New York Herald.
55 In September 1914, the New York Herald had 
stated that it would not print messages from Sayville, claiming that they were 
invented stories. In October 1915, however, Bernstorff reported that many 
papers did print Transocean’s news, although much of the public still thought 
that the news was made up. Even the New York Herald itself had taken to print-
ing Transocean news as it often contained reports not allowed by the English 
press.
56 Bernstorff concluded from this that wireless telegraphy had lessened 
the might of English censorship of telegrams, as Berlin correspondents from 
American newspapers could now use cables almost without restrictions.
57  
Despite such successes, there were many problems with the service. Tech-
nologically, Nauen and Sayville were still greatly affected by atmospheric 
disturbances, especially in early summer. Thus even more than ten percent of 
transmissions did not reach their intended destinations. Another difficulty was 
the timing of transmissions. They would often reach the respective country or 
newspaper as morning or evening papers were already going to bed. This ne-
gated the temporal advantage of wireless. Economically, Transocean was 
greatly disadvantaged by its split from the syndicate in 1915. Even before the 
industrialists had jumped ship, Transocean was greatly underfunded.
58 Appeals 
for more funds are a common thread running through much correspondence 
between Transocean representatives and the German government. 
As regards the content of the news itself, a major stumbling block for 
Transocean was its use of an omnibus service. The news sent from Nauen to 
Sayville was the news that reached Shanghai and Manila. One size most cer-
tainly did not fit all. While the Americans found the news to be too propagan-
distic, the East Asians felt that it was too American. A report on the reception 
of Transocean news in Asia stated that the service needed to avoid “its constant 
know-it-all tone, which was characteristic for Transocean’s service [to China] 
up to now.”
59 It underlined the need to report “factually” and without simply 
omitting unpleasant news. An assessment of American opinion on Trans-
ocean’s news concluded that Americans often found the news to be colourless 
or too polemical.
60 Items were often outdated, especially when they were ex-
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tracts from the London and Paris press, as these would have been transmitted 
by cable the day before. Other items were irrelevant for Transocean’s target 
audience, like birthdays of important Germans and local Berlin news such as 
the fact that there was a Fürstenzimmer (waiting room for nobility) in the new 
railway station of Friedrichstraße in Berlin, but no smoking room.
61 Transocean 
sometimes played it too safe, reporting economic news reports long after other 
agencies. For example, dividends were only published once the general assem-
bly approved them, not when it had published suggestions weeks before.
62 As 
swift economic news was where much of the money and interest lay, this was a 
serious disadvantage. Bernstorff proposed that fewer items be reported, but in 
greater depth. Furthermore, he suggested that Transocean establish contact with 
American journalists who could act as advisors and report on which items were 
published in New York papers. He also warned heavily against including 
prophesies on the future course of the war in news reports. These were often 
printed, he wrote, yet seldom corresponded with reality, damaging German 
interests and perceived trustworthiness.
63  
German wireless communication networks during World War I were “ambi-
tious, but ultimately unsuccessful”, according to Jonathan Reed Winkler.
64 
Certainly, the service was plagued by problems of all types and it failed to alter 
significantly perceptions of German war aims and actions abroad. Yet some of 
its achievements were remarkable. By the end of World War I, Nauen’s range 
had increased to 18,000 km; Transocean’s overseas service could be received 
in English around the world. Transocean’s basic infrastructure of cover agen-
cies and its personnel structure were in place, as was its commitment to ambi-
tious dissemination of its news to East Asia and South America. Its top man-
agement and editors remained. Most importantly, Schwedler remained chief 
editor from 1918 until 1936 and Stresemann, for example, remained on the 
board until he became German chancellor. 
Furthermore, the Allies realised the importance of Transocean’s use of wire-
less technology and wanted to weaken its ability to influence neutral countries. 
Article 197 of the Versailles Treaty forbade Germany from sending political 
news from Nauen, Hanover (Eilvese station) and Berlin (Königswusterhausen) 
                                                             
61  These Berlin items probably came from Transocean’s main non-governmental news source. 
Dr. Haas, chief editor of Transocean from its inception to 1918, had agreed with various 
Berlin newspapers in October 1915 that either he or a representative would stop by the edi-
tors’ office to review their telegrams and determine if any were of use for Transocean. The 
Berliner Lokalanzeiger, for example, wished to be paid 150 Marks per month for their ser-
vices. Hence any popular interest story was likely to betray its origins in a local Berlin 
newspaper. Letter on April 3, 1916, BArch R901/57868, 164. 
62  Bernstorff to Bethmann-Hollweg, October 26, 1915, BArch R901/57866, 402. 
63  Ibid., 403f. 
64  Winkler, “Information Warfare in World War I,” 853.   221
for three months after the treaty went into effect.
65 The German foreign minis-
try interpreted the clause extremely literally, enabling Transocean to continue 
to broadcast from Norddeich, which had not been mentioned in Article 197. 
Yet this was not the end of Allied suspicion of German capabilities to use and 
abuse wireless to disseminate propaganda. 
In late 1921, Alfred Lord Northcliffe (1865-1922) travelled by ship to Asia. 
A press baron in the mould of William Randolph Hearst and Alfred Hugen-
berg, Northcliffe had worked his way up from freelance journalism to owning a 
media empire. He founded the Daily Mail in 1896, the Daily Mirror seven 
years later and bought and reinvigorated the ailing Times in 1908. Northcliffe 
produced immensely successful daily papers through a combination of innova-
tive features, such as social gossip and women’s columns. During World War I, 
Northcliffe turned down Lloyd George’s offer to run the air ministry and in-
stead served as the government’s Director for Propaganda from 1917 until 
armistice. Not one to mince words, Lord Northcliffe exerted great influence on 
Lloyd George during the negotiations at Versailles by demanding that Germany 
should cover the whole cost of the war, rather than what was within its capacity 
to pay.
66 His opinions were certainly taken very seriously by both those in high 
places and ordinary newspaper buyers. Indeed, his pronouncements on the state 
of news in East Asia sparked a series of articles and investigations leading all 
the way to the House of Commons. 
Lord Northcliffe’s journey to East Asia had been filled with news. On the 
British ship, P&O Nellore, the radio operators had been receiving Transocean’s 
news from Nauen, rather than any British wireless station. Since its inception, 
German wireless had focused on sea-farers of all types as its ideal customer 
base and Transocean had built upon previous German experience in deciding to 
offer its wireless service to ships for free. British radio services, on the other 
hand, had to be paid for. For the P&O Nellore, as many other ships, a free 
thrice daily 500-word service in English was clearly appealing as an added 
extra for passengers.
67 
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Lord Northcliffe did not think the same. Upon landing in Colombo, Ceylon 
on 2 January, 1922, Lord Northcliffe said to a Times correspondent: 
Germany may not have money for reparations but she is expending immense 
resources in propaganda in the Far East by daily wireless from Berlin, by sub-
sidized newspapers and by film. I have seen the German wireless daily includ-
ing that tapped by the operators of the P. and O. Nellore during the present 
voyage. It consists largely of misleading statements, and actual lies, about E-
gypt, India, the Washington Conference, Ireland, Japan, China, the responsi-
bility for the Great War, and the gloomy condition of British trade. The wire-
less is sent out seven days a week, and is hungrily absorbed by vernacular 
writers in all Far Eastern countries, where countless wireless stations now ex-
ist. I was a close student of the notorious Berlin wireless during the war, and 
believe that the same minds are writing the present mischievous dispatches.
68 
Northcliffe continued by stating that German propaganda today was just as 
dangerous as it had been during the war because of political upheaval in the Far 
East and that apart from half a dozen well-known British newspapers, the Far 
Eastern press was becoming increasingly hostile towards the British.
69 His 
views were printed in articles in the Times and Daily Mail the very next day. 
Northcliffe’s opinions provide us with three main points about his reactions 
to wireless. Firstly, Northcliffe extrapolated from news on one ship to the entire 
Far East and no subsequent article in Britain ever contradicted this logic. In 
fact, it appears that only around 25 Chinese newspapers subscribed to the ser-
vice, with one or two Transocean articles published a day. Secondly, North-
cliffe believed the service to be fully funded by the German government and 
took it as proof that the Germans were not really in such dire financial straits. 
Reparations were an issue particularly close to Northcliffe’s heart: his harsh 
stand on the matter had forced Lloyd George’s hand at the Versailles negotia-
tions. As regards the funding of Transocean, he was of course correct, though 
his conclusion following from that fact is disputable. 
Thirdly, Northcliffe emphasized the continuity between World War I and 
the present in German journalism and its personnel. The personnel was indeed 
mostly composed of the same individuals: for example, Wilhelm Schwedler 
remained chief editor of Transocean from 1918 until his death in 1936 and Otto 
Hammann remained head of the advisory committee until 1924. That did not 
necessarily entail the same attitudes to news. Transocean had moved out of the 
foreign ministry’s building in November 1918 and this spatial change accom-
panied a somewhat different attitude to reporting. In his 1922 book on news, 
Schwedler pleaded for an end to the “stain” of propaganda as conducted during 
the war and advocated a move to “truthful publishing.”
70 Schwedler’s truth did 
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not mean objective reporting, however. In his report on Northcliffe’s attacks on 
Transocean, Schwedler declared that Transocean’s reports were most certainly 
not propaganda, but rather that they attempted to find the golden mean between 
simply reporting facts and serving political purposes. Schwedler’s truth did not 
mean that Transocean sat on the political fence.  
The Times took Northcliffe’s accusations particularly seriously, undertaking 
its own investigations into his claims of bad and biased journalism. The paper 
printed a series of articles dealing with Transocean over the coming weeks. Its 
Berlin correspondent wrote an article claiming that Transocean’s main goals 
were to portray Germany as peaceful and suffering due to Allied demands and 
to “induce the world to change the opinion formed of Germany during the 
war.”
71 Another article that same day reported that the Englishman was agitat-
ing for Northcliffe to create a coalition between the British Empire’s govern-
ments and trading firms to prevent German propaganda from ruining their 
business.
72 
The  Times  then investigated Lord Northcliffe’s condemnation of Trans-
ocean’s news as inaccurate and disingenuous by subscribing to Transocean for 
one week in mid-January and one in mid-February 1922. In its article of 17 
January on the first week, the author faulted the service for bad English and 
using so much jargon that the Times writers had to read some parts four or five 
times to understand them. The messages were indeed so difficult to interpret 
that “the chances seem to be that Nauen would be unable to recognize its own 
children if it saw them in their last transformation in print.”
73 The Times also 
accused the Transocean service of “flatness” in its reporting on Aristide Bri-
and’s resignation and derided its inability to prioritize important news, for 
instance ignoring the Anglo-Irish agreement in favour of a report on the Ser-
bian government’s order of 20,000 frame houses from Germany.  
For the second week in mid-February, the Times also subscribed to British 
and French wireless services, summarizing in an article on 21 February that: 
“this preliminary glance provides one with amusement at the extent to which 
characteristics conventionally attributed to the three nations appear in their 
wireless.” The British news reports were insular, narrow and unbalanced; the 
French had the broadest range of topics and were clear, though “notable for a 
kind of logic susceptible to occasional aberration.” The German service was 
condemned, as it had been in January, for “dragging in [press] opinions regard-
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less of their value” and furthermore this time, for being “puerile, clumsy, but 
none the less insidious.”
74 
The Times’ gravest accusation was that Transocean disseminated false and 
distorted news. A report on February 28 claimed that the German news service 
had mangled an item from the Times on the Prince of Wales’ visit to India. The 
Times reported that several members of the Prince of Wales’ party in India had 
been shot at and that the identity of the assailants was unknown. Transocean, 
on the other hand, had twisted this to report that a “Mohammedan nationalist” 
had fired on the Prince of Wales himself, citing the Times as its source for the 
story. A week later, the German consul in Calcutta confirmed in a letter to the 
German Foreign Ministry that Transocean’s version was incorrect.
75  
The Times’ assessment of Transocean was in fact fairly accurate. Even a 
German envoy to Peking, von Schoen, complained about the dreadful English 
in Transocean’s Nauen service, giving these examples: “Even the communists 
confinded themselves within order” and “the Hitlerites have filed protest to the 
Ministry of the Interior and threaten to proclaim the election guilty.”
76 Its news 
was not of the highest quality and sorely needed a better system of news collec-
tion. J. Plaut, Transocean’s representative in Asia, constantly emphasized this 
point, yet the funds were simply not there. Transocean’s employees were badly 
paid and, by extension, usually under-qualified, as journalists turned to news-
papers or other agencies for better salaries. The service continued to be an 
omnibus and thus barely adapted for differences between South America, Ja-
pan, China and Europe.  
The Times’ articles were the basis for articles around the globe.
77 The story 
also spread to Japan and China. Transocean’s wireless service had only been 
operating in China properly since September 1921 and was disseminated by the 
Chinese Mitchell Chang under the name “Asiatic News Agency, Chinese Wire-
less Service, Berlin resp. Nauen” in English or “Deutsch-chinesische Tele-
gramm Agentur” in German.
78 While Northcliffe’s comments themselves were 
barely reported, the Peking and Tientsin Times reported on subsequent Times 
articles. According to the German ambassador in Peking, all foreign and some 
Chinese newspapers printed the House of Commons question on Transocean 
verbatim without commentary.
79 In Japan, on the other hand, the Japanese 
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Foreign Minister, Uchida Kōsai, assured the German ambassador to Tokyo that 
Northcliffe’s name had a “nasty ring” to it in Japan.
80 Indeed, on March 3, the 
Japan Chronicle criticized Northcliffe’s hypocrisy in a biting commentary, 
remarking that clearly propaganda itself was not Northcliffe’s problem, but 
rather that it was the Germans engaging in it.  
It was no coincidence that the comments were picked up in Tribuna in Italy 
in early February 1922 via Marrchese Solari, the manager of Marconi in Italy, 
whose sympathies and business interests lay firmly on the side of the British. In 
France, meanwhile, the comments were little reported in newspapers them-
selves. They did cause concern amongst politicians, who feared the spread of 
false German news, most probably because of the ongoing battle for the control 
of news in the occupied Rhineland and the Ruhr. In late February, the French 
prime minister and foreign minister, Raymond Poincaré, ordered the French 
radio station at Bordeaux to keep a constant watch over news from Nauen and 
to correct any news, which could be detrimental to France.
81 
Still, no reaction came close to matching either the stream of British articles 
or the Times’ effort in investigating the service. Indeed, in early March, con-
cerns over Transocean were voiced at the highest political level. On March 6, 
1922, Percy Angier Hurd (1864-1950), the first of four generations of Hurds to 
sit in the British House of Commons, asked if the Prime Minister, David Lloyd 
George (1863-1945), “knew that the German wireless Press service from 
Nauen was spreading anti-British and anti-French propaganda around the 
globe.”
82 Hurd posed the question in the House of Commons to Austen Cham-
berlain (1863-1937), at that time leader of the Conservatives in the House of 
Commons and head of the office of the Lord Privy Seal. Chamberlain replied 
that Lloyd George did know about Nauen and that now three wireless messages 
were being prepared daily by the Foreign Office News Department and being 
broadcast from the General Post Office wireless station at Leafield. Chamber-
lain claimed that these messages were being “reproduced in most European 
countries and by ships at sea” and that they would hopefully make it to the Far 
East once the wireless station at Cairo was complete.
83 The exchange demon-
strates British awareness that they lagged behind the Germans in their creation 
of a wireless network and that the Germans’ clear advantage spurred Britain’s 
urgency in the matter. But why did the British react most strongly to news from 
Nauen and Northcliffe’s assertions? There are several obvious answers to this 
question. These were comments initially made by an English press baron; it 
was a service on a British ship. Yet these explanations paint a very black-and-
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white picture. The real reasons lie rather in the space and method of transmis-
sion: the sea and the wireless.  
Ships were in fact the first area where the Nauen wireless came to the 
Times’ attention. On July 2, 1921, the Times had published a letter from R. G. 
Findlater, who wondered “whether it is generally realized that over many of the 
waves which Britannia rules German propaganda is the only news received by 
the traveller and seafarer for weeks together.”
84 Findlater wrote that on his last 
four trips to East Asia in the past year, the liners had all posted news from 
Nauen, often not even mentioning its source. In conclusion, he called for an 
imperial wireless service to counteract this development.  
Findlater referred explicitly to the refrain of the unofficial British anthem 
since the mid-eighteenth century: “Rule Britannia! Britannia rule the waves.”
85 
It is a truism that Great Britain built an empire of the seas; historiographically, 
the oceans as a region of analysis and important source of ideology have been 
the focus of much recent attention, not least for Britain.
86 As David Armitage 
explains, the British had solved the contradictory but cherished values of mare 
liberum (that is, free trade) and mare clausum (that is, a maritime empire) by 
somewhat hypocritically claiming to rule the waves while ensuring freedom on 
the oceans.
87 By the time James Thompson wrote “Rule Britannia” in 1740, the 
British conceived of Britain as a “maritime power, with a commercial destiny 
based on its natural insularity.”
88 Buttressed by the ideas of Alfred Mahan 
(1840-1914) that the navy was the crucial factor in winning wars, the Germans 
challenged Britain’s imperial supremacy through a naval arms race from the 
1890s. The sea thus became the ultimate “cultural space of the imperial age” 
prior to World War I with the launch of ships providing an opportunity for 
great spectacles intended to drum up national support for naval projects.
89 
                                                             
84  R. G. Findlater, “News at Sea,” The Times, July 2, 1921, letters. 
85  The poem, “Rule Britannia,” was written by James Thomson and set to music by Thomas 
Arne in 1740. 
86    For recent discussions of methods and theory of maritime history, see “AHR Forum: 
Oceans of History,” American Historical Review 111:3 (2006): 717-780; Bernhard Klein 
and Gesa Mackenthun, eds., Sea Changes: Historicizing the Ocean (New York: Routledge, 
2004). 
87  The British achieved this principally through the Navigation Acts of the 1660s, whereby all 
European goods headed for America or other British colonies had to stop in Britain. These 
acts were only repealed in 1849. 
88  David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 106. British identity is of course far more complex and 
multi-faceted than represented here. See, for example, Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the 
Nation, 1707-1837 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); Robert Colls, The Identity 
of England (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Keith Robbins, Great 
Britain: Identities, Institutions and the Idea of Britishness (New York: Longman, 1998); 
Paul Ward, Britishness since 1870 (London and New York: Routledge, 2004). 
89  Jan Rüger, The Great Naval Game. Britain and Germany in the Age of Empire (Cambridge 
and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 213.   227
Launch celebrations were suspended during World War I, but restored in the 
1920s and 1930s, though with much reduced fleets as a result of the Washing-
ton Conference and Scapa Flow.
90 The sea thus continued to retain an element 
of its pre-World War I significance as the “location of a nation’s struggle for 
survival in which it would either flourish or vanish.”
91 
The importance of the sea helps us to understand why Lord Northcliffe so 
readily extrapolated from the news reports he read on the P&O liner to the 
entirety of East Asia. After all, control of the oceans was a means to assert 
economic control and political influence. Demonstrating naval might remained 
a method to avow imperial unity into the 1930s.
92 As a media magnate, Lord 
Northcliffe clearly regarded Transocean’s entry into the naval news market as a 
direct threat to British imperial control as a whole. His creation of an uproar 
about news from Nauen certainly alerted the British public and government to 
what he perceived as threatening German behaviour. It seems that Northcliffe 
took wireless as pars pro toto evidence of Germany’s continuing belligerence 
even after Versailles, just as many British leaders perceived the naval arms race 
prior to World War I as evidence of Germany’s general jingoism. Wilhelm 
Schwedler speculated that Northcliffe was also motivated by the more practical 
aim of hindering Transocean’s future success by restricting its transmission 
times and the wavelengths it could use to disseminate news.
93 This leads us to 
the second reason for the resonance of Northcliffe’s complaints: Germans’ use 
of wireless technology. 
The niche of the sea was wireless’ biggest potential market: the German 
navy and trading companies were Telefunken’s first major customers, greatly 
influencing the development of the wireless system.
94 Especially after the sink-
ing of the Titanic, the market became more regulated and wireless’ importance 
for safety on the seas was taken far more seriously.
95 What had been wireless’ 
main vice became its ultimate virtue: its ability to broadcast in multiple direc-
tions at once became a key feature of its ability to increase safety on the seas. 
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The German government first took advantage of this capability during World 
War I, when Transocean often transmitted messages “to everyone.” This usage 
points towards radio’s later use for broadcasting, although this was only possi-
ble after the invention of electron tubes which enabled the transmission of 
continuous waves and thus sound.
96 In terms of the press, the German Postal 
Ministry established press news for ships from the radio station, Norddeich, in 
1907. Wolffs Telegraphisches Bureau broadcast 200 words twice a day, which 
ships then used to create on-board newspapers.
97 As ever fewer passenger ships 
sailed during World War I and especially after America’s entry into the war, 
this function became obsolete, and Transocean took it up thereafter, broadcast-
ing 500 words daily in English.
98 Transocean sent out its news for free as it was 
subsidized by the German government. Ships took its news to cut costs, al-
though it is hard to estimate exactly how many ships took the service, as any 
ship with a radio could receive the service within the right range. British and 
American companies, meanwhile, only offered their services for payment, 
because of copyright restrictions. Indeed, the British had been surprisingly 
inactive about building up a wireless network prior to World War I; in com-
parison to governmental cable committees’ energetic efforts to establish its All-
Red Route and maintain its cable superiority, “the wireless subcommittee 
seemed defeated from the start.”
99 Britain also paid similarly little attention to 
destroying German wireless stations during World War I, all of which helps to 
explain Northcliffe’s surprise and horror at Transocean’s strong position in 
Asia. In contrast to Britain’s lethargy in establishing wireless networks up to 
the early 1920s, Germany’s legal infrastructure and government financial sup-
port offered Transocean the opportunity to take advantage of radio’s ability to 
broadcast within a wide range and reach anyone able to pick up its signals.  
Nevertheless, Transocean’s success in Asia was short-lived. After broad-
casting directly to Japan, in the late 1920s, the Japanese government forbade it 
from transmitting to its wireless station, claiming it wanted to free up time for 
its own messages. For the next few years, Transocean was forced to send news 
                                                             
96  Friedewald, “The Beginnings of Radio Communication in Germany, 1897-1918,” 460. The 
German government remained preoccupied with the problem of ensuring that purchasers of 
radios would pay their subscription fees. A 1923 amendment set out the punishments of 
fines of up to 1 million Marks and prison sentences to prevent users listening for free. The 
Reich radio commission even suggested cancelling the service altogether if too many peo-
ple did not pay fees. BArch R3301/209, 43. 
97  Friedewald, “Telefunken und deutsche Schiffe, 1903-1914”, 40. 
98  Transocean sent 500 broadcasts of approximately 400 words in 1920, then 400 of approxi-
mately 400 words in 1921 and 1922, thus adding up to approximately 500 words a day. 
These went overseas. Up to August 21, 1922, Transocean also sent 1000 words daily from 
Nauen to Europe, thereafter from Eilvese. “Statistik der Reichspost- und Telegraphenver-
waltung,” 1923, BArch R3301/2098, 98. 
99  The Post Office only signed a contract with Marconi’s to build six imperial wireless sta-
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to Japan from China via cable, thus eliminating most of the advantages of wire-
less. Developments in the Chinese political situation made news dissemination 
there increasingly difficult. The service grew in popularity in South America 
after the introduction of more reliable short-wave radio in 1929. Ships contin-
ued to subscribe to the Transocean service; a letter to the Times on May 15, 
1927 stated that the Nauen wireless was still ubiquitous on ships in East Asia. 
Only in the Nazi period, however, did Transocean have the funds to make 
significant waves in the global newspaper market. The Nazis poured money 
into the enterprise: subsidies nearly trebled from 1936 to 1937.
100 Transocean 
worked alongside Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro in many areas and achieved far 
more recognition post-1933 than it ever had before. As World War II turned 
increasingly against Germany, Transocean’s range shrank accordingly. Al-
though it was only formally struck from the register in 1957, it had distributed 
no news since the end of World War II. 
Transocean might initially seem like a mere footnote to news agency his-
tory, especially before 1933. In fact, it is an excellent demonstration of how the 
technology made the news, rather than the words contained in the transmission. 
Transocean and the German government’s exploitation of the medium (or 
rather media) very much determined the message.
101 Wireless filled in the gaps 
which cable telegraphy could not bridge. Prior to World War I, this generally 
meant that ships could communicate swiftly with land. For Germany, though, 
wireless telegraphy held much more promise than for the British. It offered a 
chance to avoid the British-dominated cable routes to various German colonies 
in Africa and Asia. Furthermore, the Germans understood how to take advan-
tage of the new possibilities offered by circumventing Britain’s attempt at a 
communication blockade in World War I and by broadcasting to moving “tar-
gets” of ships after the war. Wireless telegraphy remained one of Germany’s 
only means to disseminate its news outside its territory in the early 1920s. As a 
news agency outside the renegotiated cartel agreement, Transocean was free to 
spread its news as it pleased; it focused primarily on using that news to raise 
Germany’s profile abroad and favourably influence Asia and South America. 
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The British meanwhile rather sat on the laurels of their “All-Red Route” of 
cables and only really developed an imperial wireless chain in the early 1920s. 
Once British cable steamers had cut five of Germany’s undersea cables in 
the first months of World War I, wireless news from the Nauen transmission 
station remained the only method to disseminate news overseas. Political im-
peratives dictated wireless’ target audiences in America, South America and 
East Asia, in turn influencing the location of receiving stations on the East 
Coast of America and the constant increased range of reception required. Con-
versely, wireless technology redrew the boundaries of the possible in news 
dissemination and political influence. As Pinkerton and Dodds suggest, this 
entailed very different spatial concepts than cables: a “sonic geopolitics.”
102 In 
the German case, East Asia and ships became accessible news markets. With 
the support of both imperial and Weimar governments, Transocean took advan-
tage of these developments to spread its news in hitherto untapped audiences. 
Helped by different copyright regulations, and supported by government subsi-
dies, Transocean could offer its news to all ships for free. The sea had been the 
ultimate battleground between Germany and Great Britain for both military 
supremacy and the wireless market prior to World War I. The importance of 
the sea did not just disappear after the war; the ocean remained a referential 
space, an arena which still set the precedent on land for many, including Lord 
Northcliffe.  
Wilhelm Schwedler dismissed the Northcliffe episode in his 1922 book as a 
drop in the ocean. For him, it was only important because it demonstrated that 
the German press had indeed begun to tread that elusive “path to freedom” – 
one which would subsequently be trodden by the German people and govern-
ment.
103 Liberty to disseminate news via wireless was the precedent for politi-
cal freedom in Schwedler’s eyes. The end of the road was far, but Schwedler 
believed that wireless technology provided the resources for Germany to reach 
autonomy, slowly but surely. Neither the introduction of more reliable short 
waves nor radio as a spoken mass medium, however, enabled German news to 
reach the lofty goals Schwedler proclaimed. In the Weimar Republic, news did 
not become a profitable commodity for Transocean nor did its quality vastly 
improve. Its tone was often inappropriate and its content lacking. Yet the Ger-
man government’s support for Transocean’s exploitation of the possibilities 
inherent in wireless technology enabled Transocean to undermine the British-
dominated cable networks and thus to provoke an effect far beyond what its 
financial support and distribution would suggest.  
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